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The oldfashioned doctrine that morality is a set of require-
ments on conduct imposed by practical reason, requirements which 
can be set out in a deductive system, is here and there regaining 
favour.1 Yet some who incline to it dismiss it because they do not 
see how it can make sense either of the variety of morally valid 
forms of the institution of property, or of the nature of some of the 
considerations that arise when the moral validity of particular 
forms of that institution is in question. 
Their difficulty is this. In every human society the moral system 
of which expresses requirements of practical reason some form of 
property must be instituted, because no human society could be 
utterly without any form of it. Hence any actual moral system to 
which a true deductive theory would apply would have to contain 
precepts, such as the familiar prohibition of stealing, relating to 
that institution. But since there may well be as many forms of the 
institution of property as there are societies the moral systems of 
which express requirements of practical reason, what such a precept 
as Thou shall not steal refers to in one of those societies may differ 
widely from what it refers to in another. These differences are 
readily explained by taking such precepts to be elliptical, so that 
Thou shall not steal, when set out in full, would become something 
like: Within the territorial boundaries of an established political 
society thou shalt not appropriate what, according to the form of 
property instituted in that society, is the property of another indi-
The printed version of this lecture is a third longer than the one that was 
delivered. For pointing out mistakes and infelicities in the original version, 
thereby giving me an opportunity to correct them, I am deeply grateful to those 
members of the audience who made comments immediately after it, and to my 
hospitable hosts, the members of the Department of Philosophy at Kansas, who 
made others later still. 
vidual or group. However, if this is the sense of the moral precept 
forbidding stealing, it seems to follow that no such precept could 
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possibly follow from the fundamental principles of a deductive 
system expressing requirements of practical reason. The historical 
origins of the forms of property actually in force, when not obscure, 
are as various as they are colourful. But there is no existing polit-
ical society in which the property rights legally recognized can be 
seriously held to derive, by legitimate transfer or inheritance, from 
original appropriations that accord with the fundamental principles 
of any defensible deductive moral theory. Must we not conclude, 
then, either that there is no society in which the property rights 
actually recognized are morally valid, or that morality is not what 
deductive theories of it take it to be? 
Well no, we need not. But the way out unfortunately appears 
to lead to even worse moral difficulties. Still, let us see what the 
way out is. 
There are institutions which make it possible for individuals 
to create moral duties which morality itself does noL The institu-
tion of giving and accepting promises is the most obvious example. 
Even where that institution exists, nobody is compelled either to 
give or to accept a promise; and if none were given or accepted, 
there would be no promises which anybody had the duty to keep. 
But although morality by itself creates no duties of promise-keeping, 
it does provide that, certain conditions being met (for example, 
that the promise not be to do anything immoral), if a promise is 
made and accepted, then it must be kept. 
Political society is another institution by which human beings, 
in this instance by organized collective action, can create moral du-
ties which morality itself does not. A political society is an organ· 
ized group of human beings established in a region of the earth, 
within the boundaries of which it enforces its authority to deter-
mine not only what system of legal justice shall obtain, but also on 
what terms any other institution or society may exist. To be genu-
inely political, such a society must express, over a reasonable period, 
the continuing will of a sizable body of its opinion-making mem· 
bers, whether they are politically enfranchised or noL Hence no 
political society can endure unless, consistently with maintaining 
its authority, it responds to deep and sustained public demands for 
institutional change: if it does not respond, either it will dissolve, 
or it will degenerate into a nonpolitical tyranny. 
Morality permits political societies to exist, just as it permits 
the institution of making and accepting promises. Hence it. permits 
a political society to legislate concerning the system of justice that 
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shall obtain in it, and concerning the terms on which other insti-
tutions or societies shall exist in it. Although most of the laws thus 
passed will not themselves be deductible from the principles of 
morality, morality confers a moral sanction on them by permitting 
the existence of the political society that has passed them. Besides 
incurring whatever legal penalties may be imposed, to break the 
laws of a morally permissible existing political society is morally 
wrong. Now the system of justice of any existing political society 
will both define the forms of property instituted in that society, and 
provide for their protection. May not the moral basis of respect for 
the forms of property established in any actual political society then 
be simply the moral duty of lawabidingness? 
Up to a point, it not only may be, but is. Consider the transfer 
to his heirs of the property of somebody presumed dead. Legislation 
as to the conditions under which death is to be presumed is ob-
viously necessary, different political societies legislate differently, 
and morally there need not be a pin to choose between the differ-
ent laws they enact. It therefore seems hardly deniable that whether 
or not a given heir has a moral title to property bequeathed to him 
by a missing person will depend wholly on the political society in 
which that property is held: in one society the missing person may 
be presumed dead under the circumtances that obtain, and in an-
other not. Unfortunately, however, there is an objection in prin-
ciple to settling all cases of moral title to property in this simple if 
indirect way. In considering the nonpolitical institution of prom-
ising it was remarked that, while the making and accepting of 
promises creates duties that morality by itself does not, it cannot 
create duties that violate the principles of morality: no promise to 
do something immoral is morally binding. No more can a political 
society, by legislation, create duties to violate the principles of 
morality. Because political society is a morally permissible form of 
human association, members of such societies have a moral duty to 
abide by their laws. But that duty is conditional upon whether the 
laws of those societies are themselves consistent with morality. 
Taking it as established that the fonns of property instituted 
in a given political society give rise to moral duties only if they are 
consistent with the principles of morality, what conditions, if any, 
do the principles of morality impose on fonns of property? 
So far, it has been possible to examine the implications of 
morality for the institution of property neutrally, without deciding 
between different positions as to what the principles of morality are. 
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On no consistent theory of morality can legal duties that violate 
moral principles be sanctioned by those principles. But since what 
conditions, if any, morality may impose on property must depend 
on what its principles are, it can occasion no surprise that those 
who disagree about what the principles of morality are often dis-
agree about what forms of property are morally permissible. In ex-
ploring the conditions imposed by morality on property, then, 
neutrality is out of the question. We can proceed only if, at least 
for the sake of discussion, we can agree about what the principles 
of morality are. 
According to the oldfashioned conception of morality that gave 
rise to the topic of this lecture, for an action to be morally right or 
wrong is the same thing as for it to be unconditionally required 
or forbidden by practical reason. Such a conception of morality 
presupposes that reason is practical as well as theoretical: that is, 
that there are rational answers to questions of the form, 'Shall an 
action of such and such a kind be done in circumstances of such 
and such a kind, or not?' as well as to those of the form 'Is it true 
that so-and-so, or false?' Nor is that all. Many who, like Professor 
Philippa Foot, agree that reason is practical, would nevertheless 
confine its practical application to laying down hypothetical im-
peratives of the sort Kant called 'imperatives of skill': that is, to 
prescribing what kinds of action are to be done, or not done, on the 
hypothesis that an end of a certain kind is to be realized. 2 While 
the principle underlying imperatives of skill is not in itself hypo-
thetical-in effect it forbids protracted indecision, and commands 
us to make up our minds whether to fish or cut bait3-the specific 
imperatives of skill to which it gives rise are all conditional, and so 
not moral. They command no kind of action unconditionally-
except that either you abandon your proposed end, or do what is 
necessary for attaining it. A kind of action can be morally right 
only if it would be contrary to practical reason to omit to do it, 
irrespective of whatever ends you seek; and it can be morally wrong 
only if it would be contrary to practical reason to do it. As Kant 
put it, the imperatives of morality cannot be conditional upon 
whatever ends we may wish to realize: they are categorical ... 
Morality can be analysed in terms of practical reason only if 
reason does unconditionally require that, in certain kinds of situ-
ation, certain kinds of action be done, or not be done. Does it? 
And if it does, by what process does it require it? 
In answer, Kant described two processes by which practical 
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reason generates moral requirements; and he mistakenly asserted 
that they are equivalent.11 Both remain widely misunderstood, al-
though recent commentators like Professor Aune get them right.& 
The first was the use of his celebrated universalization test. How-
ever, to that it has been reasonably objected that, in most depart-
ments of morality, it fails to yield sufficiently specific results-even 
though Hegel's complaint was unjust that it yields no more than 
the form of moral precepts, without any content at all. The second 
was derivation from the principle that every rational being is to be 
treated as an end, and never merely as a means. Following Henry 
Sidgwick and W. D. Ross, the fashion endures among English-
speaking philosophers of dismissing this principle as highminded 
but unintelligible.1 No worse mistake could be made. For as Kant 
explained, only to be stubbornly misread by Sidgwick and Ross, 
two kinds of end must be distinguished: producible ends, which 
agents try to bring about; and self-subsistent ends, or existing beings 
for whose sake producible ends are produced. Producible ends are 
necessarily conditional upon the existence of self-subsistent ends, 
and on what the needs of those ends may be. Self-subsistent ends, 
by contrast, are ends-in-themselves. 
Reason can be practical in the way morality presupposes only if 
there are self-subsistent ends, or ends-in-themselves. And Kant held 
that there are such ends. 'Man, and in general every rational being, 
exists as an end in himself and not merely a.s a means to be arbi-
trarily used by this or that will.'& 
In what follows, I shall assume that Kant was right, and that in 
this recognition of rational nature as an end in itself we have the 
foundation of traditional western morality. '\\'bile I shall not try to 
establish either assumption, having done so elsewhere,9 a little by 
way of elucidation must be added. In offering Kant's principle as 
the foundation of morality, I mean that there is nothing more 
fundamental from which it can be derived. However, I do not offer 
it as an intuitive truth: I do not think its truth is evident to every 
rational being who understands it and thinks about il Some phi-
losophers hold that it, or something very like it, can be established 
dialectically; as Aristotle attempted to establish the principle of 
contradiction. For example, my colleague, Professor Alan Gewirth, 
has attempted so to establish it in his monumental book Rea.son 
and Morality,10 an anticipation of which he presented to you in the 
Lindley Lecture for 1972, 'Moral Rationality.' I have not made up 
my mind on whether any such attempt can succeed (or, a fortiori, 
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that any particular one has succeeded). But I maintain that we can 
rationally judge that it is contrary to practical reason to treat any 
being of rational nature merely as a means to the wellbeing of any 
other being whatever, even if it cannot be established dialectically. 
It is a matter of recognizing the unique status of beings who have 
the power to choose the ends of their actions as they see fit. 
In offering his theory of the foundation of morality, Kant pro-
fessed no more than to have formulated, with philosophical exacti-
tude, a truth recognized in the popular moral culture of his society. 
His unphilosophical neighbours would probably have expressed it 
in biblical terms, quoting such things as St James's reference in his 
Epistle to 'the royal law according to the Scripture [that is, the 
Jewish Scripture), "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' ' 
(2:8). Because the word 'love' is now primarily associated with 
emotion, and often confined to erotic emotion, I have elsewhere 
suggested that in our day StJames's royal law might be less mis-
leadingly expressed as 'Thou shalt respect thy neighbor and thyself 
as rational beings.'11 Curiously this would itself have been mislead-
ing when the King James version of the New Testament was made; 
for in the very next verse the translators used the phrase 'respecter 
of persons' to stand for something opposed to what they meant by 
'love of one's neighbour'-namely, for violating what is owed to 
each of one's neighbours out of special regard for some of them. 
It is often objected that in no form is the Kantian foundation 
sufficiently definite for its implications to be rigorously worked out. 
Such an objection would have weight if traditional morality were 
formalizable as an axiomatic system. In such a system, the reference 
of such an expression as 'treat as an end' (or 'love' or 'respect') 
would be implicitly fixed by a set of axioms containing it: an ac-
ceptable reference would be held to be provided by any assignment 
of sense to it such that, taken in that sense, those axioms would be 
true. Kant, of course, neither provided such a set of axioms, nor 
believed that one can be provided. As the structure of his Grundle-
gung unmistakably shows, he took it for granted that the sense of 
'treat as an end,' and the senses of other expressions related to it, 
were revealed in practical judgements embodying the corresponding 
German expressions that were made in the common life of his 
society. The same would hold for the sense of any equivalent 
expression, such as the biblical 'love' or my 'respecL' Those who 
introduce such expressions in formulating the foundation of moral-
ity presume themselves to be addressing an audience in whose 
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culture those expressions or others close to them in sense are in 
familiar use, and who either agree on their application in most 
cases, or at least find their disagreements mutually intelligible. If, 
for example, you cannot perceive that it made sense for Kant to 
hold that killing somebody for a whim fails to treat him as an end, 
whereas killing him in self-defence does not so fail, then you have 
certainly not understood what he referred to as 'failing to treat 
somebody as an end.' At the same time, it would be very difficult, 
after a simple explanation had been given, to take seriously any 
normally educated person in our society who protested that he 
found what Kant meant by 'treat as an end' simply opaque. 
Inasmuch as it has to do with duties to human beings, oneself 
or others, traditional western morality has, so I maintain, only one 
fundamental principle, although that principle may be formulated 
in a variety of ways, and has been. In what follows I shall make use 
of a Kantian formulation of it, rather than the one I have preferred 
in my own writings on moral theory. I do so in part because such 
Kantian formulations will be familiar to all serious students of 
philosophy and in part because my not clinging to the formula I 
prefer may illustrate that several different formulations will do 
equally well. The formulation I shall employ is: It is contrary to 
practical reason for any rational being to perform any action in 
which he fails to treat every human being as an end in himself. 
That this is its sole fundamental principle by itself would suffice 
to establish that morality is not an axiomatic system, in whicl). noth· 
ing but fundamental principles may serve as premises in deductions. 
No significant specific precept can be deduced from the fundamen-
tal principle of morality alone. Every advance in moral knowledge 
rests on a new premise in which a kind of action is affirmed to be 
either a species of the general kind in which the doer fails to treat 
every human being as an end in himself, or else a subspecies of such 
a species. These additional premises, which may conveniently be 
labelled 'specificatory,' are not in themselves moral: their content 
is theoretical, not practical. That killing another who neither in-
jures nor threatens to injure anybody fails to treat him as an end 
in himself does not by itself entail that it is morally wrong (that is, 
that ·practical reason forbids it): it is a purely theoretical specifi-
cation of one kind of action in which the doer fails to treat every 
human being as an end in himself, which anybody who has grasped 
the concept of treating somebody as an end in himself may work 
out, irrespective of his moral position. In the same way, even 
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though he has a low opinion of English Common Law as a legal 
system, a legal theorist aware of the Common Law conception of 
larceny as the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal 
goods of another, so that real estate, and things that adhere to real 
estate such as com, grass, trees and the like, cannot be subjects of 
larceny, because they cannot be carried away, nevertheless should 
not need a Blackstone to inform him that, while pasturing your 
sheep on a neighbour's grass is not larceny, yet cutting his grass and 
then carrying it away is.12 Legal and moral reasoning alike depend 
on informal conceptual analysis. And it is no great feat of concep-
tual analysis to observe that cutting converts grass from something 
that adheres to real estate into something movable and so personal, 
and thence to arrive at the specificatory premise that taking and 
carrying away another's grass, after -cutting it, is taking and carrying 
away his personal goods. 
Can any restrictions on the forms of property a political society 
may institute be derived from our Kantian fundamental principle 
by rationally defensible specificatory premises? And if they can, 
what are they? 
These questions are most economically approached by critically 
examining Locke's theory of the transformation of property from a 
natural institution to a social one; for that theory, while central to 
most modem investigations of property (including those hostile to 
it), has roots in traditional western morality. Three kinds of prop-
erty may be distinguished in Locke's work: property in human 
beings and their labour or services, property in natural resources, 
and property in the products of human labour employed upon 
natural resources. By nature--that is, apart altogether from polit-
ical society-Locke held that every human being is 'Proprietor of 
his own person, and the actions or Labour o£ it,'•8 and that natural 
resources 'belong to Mankind in common, as they are produced by 
the spontaneous hand of Nature.'14 In maintaining that, in a state 
of nature, natural resources are common property, Locke did not 
imply that they are in that state used by mankind collectively. He 
meant no more than that every human individual alike may use 
them. However, since natural resources can be used in certain ways, 
for example, agriculture, only if those who so use them, for example 
by planting a field, can exclude others from the portion they use, 
Locke argued that the common property of all mankind in the 
resources of the earth confers on each man the right exclusively to 
appropriate as much of the earth as he 'Tills, Plants, Improves, 
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Cultivates and can use the Product of': for 'He by his labour does, 
as it were, inclose it from the Common.'lll 
Locke nevertheless perceived two restrictions implicit in his 
doctrine that, in the state of nature, natural resources could be 
appropriated by 'mixing' labour with them.te The first is that more 
than a man 'can make use of to any advantage of life before it 
spoils' is 'more than his share, and belongs to others.'17 The second 
is perhaps rather a condition than a restriction: namely, that in the 
state of nature, appropriating a parcel of land by improving it 
could not have been 'any prejudice to any other Man, since there 
was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unpro-
vided could use.'l& 
Even in the state o£ nature, agreements between human beings 
to put a value on scarce durable objects, like 'little piece(s) of 
yellow metal,' transform appropriation. Before such agreements, 
since exchanges of property are confined to goods that must be used 
before they spoil, nobody either can acquire very much, or has any 
reason to. But as soon as products that spoil can be exchanged for 
durable money, the industrious both can acquire indefinite amounts 
of movable property that will not spoil, and have reason to acquire 
it, because power to buy is one of the most versatile forms of power 
there is. 'Find out something that hath the Use and Value of Money 
amongst his Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin 
presently to enlarge his Possessions.'•& 
Having by their 'tacit and voluntary consent found out a way'-
the use of money-'how a man may fairly possess more land than 
he himself can use the product of,' human beings 'have agreed to 
the disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth.'20 And 
having done so, since in the state of nature the enjoyment of their 
'Persons and Possessions' is 'very uncertain, and constantly exposed 
to the Invasion of others,' they have good reason to join in political 
societies 'for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and 
Estates.'21 For political societies provide three things they need 
which the state of nature does not: (I) 'an establish'd settled, 
known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be ... the 
common measure to decide all Controversies between them': (2) 'a 
known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all dif-
ferences according to the established Law'; and (3) 'Power to back 
and support the sentence when right, and to give it due Exe-
cution.'22 
The function of political society, according to Locke's theory, 
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is not to endow human beings, by legislation, with rights to their 
lives, liberties and estates, but to preserve the rights to them with 
which nature, their nonpolitical agreement to use money, and their 
free transactions with one another have together endowed them, and 
to regulate those rights according to laws that enjoy common con-
sent. Political societies that invade those rights on the pretext of 
regulating them forfeit the very ground of their existence. 
According to Locke's theory, 'the great foundation of Property,' 
both in natural resources and in the products of employing labour 
upon them, is each human being's property in his own person and 
his own labour.2a At first sight, this is consistent with the Kantian 
principle that every human being is always to be treated as an end: 
would it not fail to treat him as an end to hold that either his 
person or his labour belong to anybody but himself? Yet there is 
difficulty. If his person and his labour are his property, may he not 
sell them, as he may sell his other property? 
With regard to his person, Locke denied that he may, on the 
ground that, since no human being has the right to take his own 
life, and since slavery is a state in which the slave has no rights 
against his owner, not even that of preserving his life, the sale of 
one's person to another would be invalid as purporting to transfer 
to another a right the seller does not himself possess. 'No body can 
give more Power than he has himsel£.'24 Such a restriction, how-
ever, betrays an inconsistency in Locke's theory. Of course one 
owner's property may be restricted by the rights of others in it: for 
example, entailed property cannot be sold because of the right of 
others to inherit it. But no human being can have more than a 
limited property in his own person if another (namely God) has 
rights in it that limit his power to dispose of it. And yet if no 
human being is (as Locke elsewhere describes him) 'absolute Lord 
of his own Person'2ll his rights in his own person cannot generate 
unlimited property either in his own labour or in the natural re· 
sources with which he mixes it. 
Locke could have escaped his inconsistency in either of two 
ways. He could have stuck consistently to the position that man is 
absolute Lord of his own person, and acknowledged his right to sell 
himself into slavery. Or he could have abandoned his doctrine that 
human beings' property in their own persons is the great foundation 
of property. Our Kantian first principle requires the latter. 
To reduce the person of a human being to a chattel at the 
disposal of another is the same thing as to reduce him to a mere 
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means to that other's purposes. This is directly contrary to the 
Kantian principle, not only for ollters, but also for himself. A man 
has no right to sell himself into slavery, not because his property in 
his person is limited by other claims upon it, but because the duty 
to treat himself as an end is his as well as others'. H Locke had 
followed this line of thought he would have condemned slavery far 
more radically and comprehensively than he did. For then he could 
not well have overlooked the flaw in the ground on which he did 
permit slavery: when it is 'the State of War continued~ between a 
lawful Conqueror, and a Captive.'20 According to the first principle 
of traditional morality, as Blackstone pointed out, 'war is itself 
justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and therefore it 
gives no other right over prisoners, but merely to disable them from 
doing harm to us, by confining their persons ... Since ••. the right 
of making slaves by captivity, depends on a supposed right of 
slaughter, that foundation failing, the consequence drawn from it 
must £aillikewise.'2'1 
If human beings are of such a nature that no political society 
has the right to reduce any of them to slavery or to hold them in 
it, what moral obligations are there towards either slaves or their 
owners in political societies in which slavery is legally established? 
Within traditional morality there have been two answers. The first 
was given by William Whewell a little over a century ago, when 
there were still slaves in the United States, and when the Fugitive 
Slave Act was still in force. It was that, while slavery is utterly 
wrong, the laws of a genuine political society are not annulled 
because they uphold it-not even those enforcing the morally spuri· 
ous property rights of slaveowners. It is, of course, everybody's duty 
to do all that can be done to repeal laws establishing slavery, but 
it would nevertheless be wrongful civil disobedience to help a slave 
to escape, even though it would not be stealing from his owner, 
because there can be no property in human beings.2s A second 
answer was given by most Abolitionists. It was that actively to abet 
a moral wrong is itself a moral wrong, and that to take any part 
whatever in upholding laws maintaining slavery would actively abet 
a moral wrong. To this it was added that, since it is a moral duty 
not to stand idly by when another human being is suffering violence 
or fraud and it is in your power to help, it would not be enough 
merely to refuse to take part in upholding slave laws; it would also 
be a duty, so far as it was possible, to give aid to anybody who 
violated those laws. 
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I do not see how, within traditional morality, the Abolitionist 
answer can be denied There is indeed a moral duty to uphold the 
laws of political societies; but that duty itseH derives from the fun-
damental principle that every human being is to be treated as an 
end, by way of the specificatory premise that not to uphold such 
laws of an established political society as accord with that principle 
would fail to treat as ends the human beings whose political will 
that society embodies. However, without the proviso that the laws 
to be obeyed accord with the fundamental principle it is sufficiently 
plain that the specificatory premise would not be true. The funda-
mental principle of morality provides a ground for all sorts of insti-
tutionally created duties, but it cannot provide for its own violation. 
The first restriction derivable from the fundamental principle 
of morality on morally permissible forms of property is therefore 
that there can be no property in the persons of human beings. 
Chattel slavery is morally wrong, and laws instituting it are morally 
void. But that cannot be all. A human being who is not a chattel 
(who cannot be killed or maimed at the will of his owner, or 
bought and sold, and who can own property, enter into contracts, 
and have political rights) may nevertheless be completely subject, 
throughout his life, with respect to his labour. Immediately after 
declaring that a slave 'the instant he lands in England, becomes a 
freeman,' Blackstone went on to lay it down that 'any right which 
[his] master may have acquired, by contract or the like, to [his] 
perpetual service . . . will remain exactly in the same state as 
before.'211 Yet would not holding a human being in a state of total 
and perpetual servitude, although a less Ragitious wrong than re-
ducing him to a chattel, nevertheless grossly fail to treat him as an 
end in himself? 
Blackstone (and implicitly Locke} thought not, and the reason 
Blackstone gave merits examination. Perpetual servitude 'is no 
more than the same state of subjection for life, which every appren-
tice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a 
longer term.'30 It seems beyond question that apprenticeship con-
tracts are morally permiss1ble. 'Why should contracts of total and 
perpetual servitude not be so as well? 
An answer at once springs to mind. A free rational being-an 
end in himself-will contract to place his labour at another's dis-
posal only if thereby he gains something that seems to him more 
worth having. Seven years' apprenticeship appears to many not to 
be too great a price to pay for thorough training in a craft. But the 
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only consideration that might induce anybody in his right mind to 
contract to place himself in total and perpetual servitude would be 
to save ~is life, his sanity, or perhaps his major bodily capacities 
(for example, sight, hearing, the use of his limbs). And since adult 
human beings in normal circumstances are capable of providing 
their own livelihood, such human beings could be confronted with 
a choice between perpetual servitude and loss of life, sanity or 
major bodily capacity only by credibly threatening either to cause 
them grave bodily harm, or forcibly to deny them access to natural 
resources or tools. In no morally decent society would such threats 
be tolerated. As for adult human beings who through no fault of 
their own are unable to provide for themselves, they are, like other 
unfortunates such as the handicapped and ill, proper objects of the 
duty of beneficence, not legitimate prey for human predators. 
Following this line of thought, it is natural to conclude that, 
when contracts to exchange labour for other goods are made in 
conditions that accord with morality, questions about their validity 
will seldom arise. While there can be no objection in principle to 
attempting to establish that certain kinds of labour contract are 
immoral, contracts of total and perpetual servitude being an ex-
ample, such an exercise would be of little practical importance. 
When the conditions under which labour contracts are reached are 
just, contracts that would be grossly exploitative, besides finding 
few or no takers, would be too opprobrious even to be offered. 
Blackstone implies that according to the laws of England in the 
eighteenth century contracts of perpetual servitude would have been 
legal; but the longest period of contractual service he mentions as 
being normal was that of apprenticeship: seven years or 'sometimes 
for a longer term,' but obviously one of the same order. 
We should, nevertheless, inquire how morality restricts the 
conditions under which a labour contract may be reached. Tradi-
tional answers to this question dwelt on conditions which anybody 
entering the labour market must satisfy: those having to do with 
such things as age, possession of marketable skills or of power to 
acquire them, and access to natural resources and tools. But in his 
justly celebrated Theory of Justice, John Rawls has proposed an 
answer in terms of distributive justice that is nontraditional at first 
sight, but which he has arrestingly protested to be no more than an 
application of the Kantian first principle.a• 
Asking himself whether there are 'substantive principles.' as 
distinct from merely formal ones, which convey 'the notion of treat-
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ing men as ends in themselves and never as only a means,• Rawls 
answers that 'it seems that' his own two principles of justice do 
'achieve this aim.'32 Since they cannot be treated as ends in them-
selves if their fundamental liberties are infringed, the first principle 
of justice must be that 'Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all.' This principle is to take priority 
over all others, so that 'liberty can only be restricted for the sake of 
liberty.'33 But what is it, while treating somebody as a means, not 
to treat him only as a means, but also as an end in himself? Rawls's 
answer is as subtle as it is economical. 
To regard persons as ends in themselves in the basic design 
of society is to agree to forgo those gains which do not 
contribute to their representative expectations. By con-
trast, to regard them as means is to be prepared to impose 
upon them lower prospects of life for the sake of the 
higher expectations of others.:w 
This generates his second principle of justice, of which clause (a) is 
usually referred to as 'the difference principle': 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all u~der 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.&~~ 
It is also laid down that clause (b), providing for fair opportunity, 
'is prior to the difference principle:ao 
The difference principle amounts to a requirement that social 
and economic goods are to be distributed equally, except to the 
extent that an unequal distribution will benefit the worst off. Is this 
principle, subject to the priority of liberty and of fair opportunity, 
a reasonable specification of what the Kantian first principle implies 
for the distribution of social and economic goods? 
It is fundamental to Rawls's thinking, as it was to Locke's, that 
only by social co-operation can the individuals composing a modern 
political society produce the enormous volume of goods and serv-
ices they do. Working in isolation as individuals, their aggregate 
product would be tiny by comparison. Now, as Rawls points out, 
'persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced 
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by their collaboration are to be distributed, for in order to pursue 
their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share.37 There must 
be social agreement on how benefits are to be distributed, and in a 
just society it will be agreed that they are to be distributed fairly. 
Well, would it not be fair to allot to each a share in the social 
product proportional to the value of his productive contribution to 
it? Not according to Rawls. For what a given individual is able 
to contribute will depend in part on his natural endowments, and 
in part on how far his place in society as child and youth enabled 
him to cultivate those endowments; and 'one of the fixed points of 
our considered judgments [seems to be] that no one deserves his 
place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one 
deserves one's starting place in society.'as Nor is even the magnitude 
of one's conscientious effort a fair measure of the share to which 
one is entitled: 'the better endowed are more likely, other things 
equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to 
discount for their greater good fortune.' 39 Hence a fair society must 
redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality,'40 But 
unfortunately, distribution affects production, and distributing the 
social product equally would so diminish it that everybody would 
get less than he might. And so Rawls concludes: 
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a 
more favorable starting place in society. But it does not 
follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There 
is another way to deal with them. The basic structure [of 
society] can be arranged so that these contingencies work 
for the good of the least fortunate.n 
This amounts to an indirect answer to our question, 'What 
restrictions are imposed by the Kantian principle on the conditions 
under which a labour contract may be reached?' It is indirect, 
because it specifies them by reference to their outcome. They are 
whatever restrictions will have the effect of maximizing the social 
and economic goods that fall to the lot of the least fortunate. As 
an interpretation of Kant this answer is surprising, but none the 
worse for that. However, as its implications were explored, espe-
cially along the lines opened up by Robert Nozick,•2 serious diffi-
culties were disclosed, not only in it, but in any answer in terms of 
the outcome (or, in No7.ick's vivid terminology, of the 'end state') 
that restrictions on the conditions of labour contracts are to bring 
about. 
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While no thinker can intelligibly advance a moral theory 
which he acknowledges to be at odds with his practical convictions, 
students of the writings of a moral theorist will dig a pit for them-
selves if they assume that everything for which he stands in practice 
must be compatible with his theories. Thus even if it be true, as 
C. B. Macpherson has ably contended, that Locke's practical object 
was to promote what Marxists call the dictatorship of the bour-
geoisie, only by violence can the text of his Second Treatise on 
Government be read as always doing so.48 Rawls's Theory of jus-
tice contains not only a theory, but also descriptions of how it may 
be applied. Such passages as Section 43, entitled 'Background Insti-
tutions for Distributive Justice,' demonstrate beyond doubt that the 
institutions he would propose for applying his difference principle 
are liberal, and not in themselves morally objectionable. But we 
are not entitled to infer that the difference principle, in his theory 
as a whole, has only the liberal applications he himself would 
countenance. 
Just what social structures would, in a given situation, and 
consistently with the prior principles Rawls recognizes, secure the 
result that differences in productive capacity work for the good of 
the least fortunate? That radicals notoriously differ from liberals 
about how the least fortunate are to be benefited may perhaps be 
dismissed as beside the point, since most radicals deny the priority 
of the principles of liberty and fair opportunity to the difference 
principle. But can it be shown that a society which accepted the 
difference principle, even if it scrupulously observed the priority of 
the principles of liberty and fair opportunity, would necessarily 
confine itself to liberal measures? And even if there were historical-
sociological reasons for believing that a given society would as a mat-
ter of fact, can it be shown that its Rawlsian principles require it? 
Rawls acknowledges it to be clear, 'in theory anyway,' that 'a 
liberal socialist regime can also answer to the two principles of 
justice.'44 That is important, as well as true. But it is even more 
important to determine whether or not an illiberal socialist regime 
can also answer to his two principles of justice. Might it not be the 
case in certain social situations that the least fortunate would be 
advantaged by a social system the institutions of which included 
maximum wage laws, a prohibition on any citizen acquiring capital 
goods out of his savings, or paying wages to others who choose to 
work for him, or perhaps, even outright conscription and direction 
of labour? Rawls indeed asserts that, on his theory, 'there is no 
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reason at all for the forced and central direction of labour.'4IS But 
he does not offer to demonstrate it. 
The theoretical position is this. According to Rawls, a labour 
contract is just provided that the basic structure of the society in 
which it is arrived at is such that, subject to observance of the 
principles of liberty and fair opportunity, there are no economic 
and social inequalities that do not work for the good of the least 
fortunate. Now whether a society's basic structure satisfies these 
conditions will depend on various factors in the situation that con-
fronts it: for example, on what natural resources and capital are to 
hand, and on what are the skills, social habits, and political atti-
tudes (consistent with justice) of its population. It is a complex 
technical question whether or not a given situation is such that a 
liberal basic structure can be found which in it would satisfy 
Rawls's conditions; but there can be no doubt at all that many 
situations are conceivable in which some technical experts would 
maintain that the only Rawlsian options are illiberal. Nor do I 
think it can be part of a theory of justice that serious technical 
opinions about possible practical situations must be in error. 48 
Are illiberal measures such as the forced and central direction 
of labour excluded by the principles of liberty and fair opportunity? 
Rawls lists the basic liberties laid down in the former as being 
'roughly speaking' these: 'political liberty (the right to vote and to 
be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and 
assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of 
the person along with the right to hold (personal} property; and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept 
of the rule of law.'4'1' Now these basic liberties would not directly 
exclude the conscription of labour in time of peace, much less such 
milder measures as maximum wage laws. Nor would a requirement 
that social and economic inequalities be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of oppor-
tunity-although the word 'opportunity' is less than felicitous when 
the inequalities are burdens rather than rewards. Would they 
nevertheless indirectly exclude it, by ensuring that the legislative 
and executive branches of a just political society would not adopt 
illiberal measures? Admittedly, no free political society has enacted 
the servile restrictions on individual labour and enterprise that 
prevail in the Soviet Union, except under Soviet military occupation 
or the threat of it; but historical experience of free political societies 
is meagre. Recent events in South America give reason to suspect 
19 
that political societies there that gain freedom may well elect to 
direct labour centrally, according to expert advice that only so can 
the greatest benefits to the least fortunate be assured. 
Yet control of labour to bring about any preferred distribution 
of social and economic goods would be flatly incompatible with the 
Kantian first principle of morality. 
That principle does not deny that the basic structure of a 
morally permissible society must be such that its members have 
reasonable opportunities to support themselves by their labour. 
Fourier magnified what is owed when he contended that 'since the 
process of civilization had deprived the members of society of cer-
tain liberties (to gather, pasture, engage in the chase), a socially 
guaranteed minimum provision for persons was justified as compen-
sation for the loss'; but Nozick belittles it when he argues that 
compensation is owed only to 'those for whom the benefits of 
civilization [do] not counterbalance being deprived of those partic-
ular liberties.'4B I shall shortly return to the topic of what is owed 
to each member of a society for his acceptance of the established 
system of property in natural resources. 
Whether or not human beings each have some right to the 
resources of the earth, the moral condition on which a political 
society is owed the loyalty of its members is that they be treated as 
ends in themselves. A fundamental element in a human adult's 
character as an end in himself is that, normally situated, he is able 
to provide for his own needs by his own labour. No political society 
is morally legitimate if its institutions are not such that its members 
are prepared to earn a living on reaching adulthood, and that they 
are offered the opportunity of doing so without servitude. What 
this implies about the conditions of labour will vary according to 
what productive system may be in force. There are societies of food-
gatherers and hunters that enable their membeni to earn their 
livings without servitude; and it is a scandal that so many more 
productive societies fail to do so. 
Does not the fact that not· all human beings are adults, and 
that not all adults are in the normal state of being able to support 
themselves, impose moral requirements on those adults who are? 
And might that requirement not take the form of a restriction on 
the conditions of labour? Of course. The fundamental principle 
of morality does not deny the duty of beneficence: the duty of the 
better off to help the worse off. On the contrary, it emphatically 
affirms it. But on its presupposition that adult human beings nor-
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mally support themselves, either alone or in families, to help an-
other human adult is primarily to supply him with the means of 
recovering from an injury or loss caused either by misfortune or by 
the misdoings of others. Beneficence does not require one normally 
situated human adult to support another. Those whom it is the 
duty of normally situated adults to support, as far as they reason-
ably can, are either not yet adults (their own children, or orphaned 
ones), or adults who through misfortune or the misdoings of others 
either have never been able to support themselves (the gravely 
handicapped, physically or mentally), or have ceased to be members 
of self-supporting families (widowed or abandoned mothers of 
young children), or have ceased to be self-supporting (the sick, the 
injured, the destitute aged). Whether help for those who by these 
criteria need it is provided by private or public arrangements does 
not matter, as long as it is provided. It is certainly legitimate for 
a political society to choose to make public provision for them, and 
to defray the costs by a tax graduated according to ability to pay. 
The idea underlying traditional beneficence-that normally 
situated adults are self-supporting-has nothing in common with 
that underlying the difference principle-that if one adult pro-
duces more than another, the difference is to be added to a common 
pool, and shared equally unless the result of doing so would reduce 
the amount of the smallest share.•o The one is a principle of free-
dom: it imposes duties of beneficence on the self-supporting, but 
finite ones. Having discharged them, they arc free: either to pro-
duce more, or to be idle; and if they produce more, to do with the 
product what they choose. The latter is a principle of servitude: 
not only does it expropriate to a common pool everything above 
the minimum contribution to the social product, returning only 
what is necessary to ensure that that difference will continue to be 
produced, but it also requires a social structure that takes away the 
option of idleness when one's own needs and the demands of benef-
icence have been met. Rawls's notion that to treat persons 'as ends 
in themselves in the basic design of society is to agree to forgo those 
gains which do not contribute to their representative expectations'llo 
--or, in other words, that it is to agree to forgo the difference by 
which one's own product exceeds that of another, except to the 
extent that retaining it would gratify the expectations of the worst 
off-is a fundamental mistake. On the contrary, a society in which 
persons are treated as ends in themselves would be one the basic 
structure of which is such that they can normally support them-
21 
selves without servitude or servility, and do, looking for help only 
when, through misfortune or the misdoings of others, they are in 
need. 
Locke's doctrine that every human being is proprietor of his 
own person, and of the actions or labour of it, although false in 
both its parts, nevertheless reHects two fundamental moral truths. 
As ends in themselves human beings are capable of proprietorship, 
but are such that their own persons cannot be property at all, their 
own or anybody else's. As for their labour, subject to the duties of 
supporting themselves and fulfilling their part of the common 
obligation to help those in need and to maintain and defend their 
society, it is for each to decide for himself whether to work or not, 
and under what conditions. To the extent that their society com-
pels them, over and above fulfilling these obligations, to work for 
the benefit of others, it wrongfully reduces them to servitude. 
Those who are sympathetic with the position that it is wrong 
to appropriate even part of anybody's labour for a common pool, 
to be shared out on some end-state principle of distributive justice, 
tend also to reject end-state principles for the just distribution of 
natural resources. But it does not follow, because end-state theories 
of distributive justice are wrong for labour, that they must be 
wrong for natural resources. 
The usual alternatives to end-state theories of just distribution 
have been called by Nozick 'entitlement' theories.lll Such theories 
justify a distribution, not because of its character as an end-state, 
but because it has come about by legitimate processes from a legit-
imate original state. The theory I have sketched about the distribu-
tion of labour is an entitlement theory: the labourer himself is 
entitled to work or not under what conditions he pleases; and if he 
freely contracts to work for somebody else, that person is entitled 
to that labour. 
Entitlement theories of property in natural resources are for 
the most part variants of Locke's. The pertinent elements in 
Locke's theory, which I have already outlined, are four: (1) what-
ever is produced by the spontaneous hand of nature belongs to 
mankind in common; (2) apart from political society, each human 
being may appropriate natural resources by mixing his labour with 
them, provided that he does not allow what he appropriates to 
spoil, and that he leaves enough and as good for others; (3) prop-
erty in what is appropriated may be transferred to others by gift or 
exchange-whether for other goods or services, or for money; and 
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(4} political society regulates both further appropriations of natural 
resources, and transfers of property by gift or exchange. 
Although Locke advanced this as a serious theory of property 
in natural resources in eighteenth century Europe and America, it 
is hard to see how even he could have taken it for more than a 
pious fiction. Entitlement theories of labour present no such prob-
lems: the original title is clear, and transfers few. But in no polit-
ical society on earth can titles to land be traced, through legitimate 
transfers, to an unblemished title of original appropriation. 
There is a more fundamental objection, which has been de-
cisively put by Richard Epstein: 'Property may look to be an 
individualistic institution, but the very nature and definition of the 
right seems to require some collective social institution as its base. 
No "natural" act can legitimate a social claim to property.'ll2 This 
point holds even on the assumption of Roman law that nothing is 
owned until somebody takes possession of it. But as Epstein also 
points out, on Locke's view that all natural resources are originally 
the common property of all mankind, it is utterly inexplicable why 
an individual's act in working on a piece of common property with-
out some kind of social sanction should be regarded as anything 
but an intrusion-as a foodgathering society would presumably 
regard the work of a homesteader.Gs 
To distribute labour on Rawls's difference principle would be 
wrong. so I have argued, because the labour of individuals is not a 
contribution to a commonly owned pool. But if Locke's doctrine 
be accepted that whatever is produced by the spontaneous hand of 
nature belongs to mankind in common, why should the difference 
principle not apply to it? A celebrated satirical passage in Nozick's 
Anarchy, State and Utopia is to the point here: 
Imagine a social pie somehow appearing so that no one 
has any claim at all on any portion of it, no one has any 
more of a claim than than other person; yet there must be 
unanimous agreement on how it is to be divided ... If 
things fell from heaven like manna, and no one had any 
special entitlement to any portion of it, and no manna 
would fall unless all agreed to a particular distribution, 
and somehow the quantity varied depending on the dis-
tribution, then it is plausible to claim that persons placed 
so that they could not make threats, or hold out for spe-
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dally large shares, would agree to the difference principle 
rule of distribution.M 
Anybody whom the feeding of the Israelites with manna re-
minds of the gift to man of the earth and all it brings forth, may 
well find himself composing a variation upon Nozick's words like 
this: 
The natural resources of the earth are like manna from 
heaven: no one originally has any special entitlement to 
any por~on of them, although if we cannot agree to a par-
ticular distribution, we shall be unable peaceably to get 
much benefit from them. Yet how much benefit any of us 
gets-even the worst off-depends on how the exclusive 
use of natural resources is distributed. And since none of 
us has any special claim as an individual, it would be 
unfair to adopt any distribution that disadvantages any-
one. The only distribution that satisfies this condition is 
one, equal or not, in which the benefits to the worst off are 
maximized. 
While Nozick appears not to have anticipated that his readers 
might reason along these lines, he has nevertheless implicitly ac-
knowledged that it is tempting to do so. I think we can go further, 
and conclude that it is sound. 
Complications follow. The natural resources of the earth are 
neither parcelled out among political societies or exclusively allotted 
to any one generation. Every human being shares in the common 
property of mankind, those of the future equally with those of the 
present and the past. For a preliminary exploration of these com-
plications, I cannot do better than refer you to Rawls: and nobody 
to my knowledge has yet made much advance on his preliminaries. 
If natural resources are the common property of all human 
beings, and if the value of each human being's share in that com· 
mon property is to be determined according to the difference prin-
ciple, then we can accept neither Fourier's answer nor Nozick's to 
the question, 'What is owed to a human being in return for his 
relinquishing the right to use the earth in common (to gather, 
pasture, and hunt)?' He is not necessarily owed a socially guaran-
teed minimum provision, because his share according to the differ-
ence principle in the value of the contribution of natural resources 
to the total social product may fall short of a 'minimum provision': 
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but he will certainly be owed more than what the right to gather, 
pasture or hunt would have been worth before systematic culti-
vation, because the value of natural resources is increased by the 
development of productive techniques. 
In what institutions would the common property rights of 
human beings in natural resources be best safeguarded? I do not 
know. Certainly I do not propose a worldwide holding company, 
in which every human being would have a share according to the 
difference principle, and in which all property in natural resources 
would be vested, to be leased or rented to producers according to 
the interests of the shareholders. However, the idea of such a com-
pany has a certain value as a myth, in setting fort~ the implications 
for property in natural resources of the traditional conception of 
human beings as ends in themselves, hav~ng property in common 
in whatever is produced by the spontaneous hand of nature. 
Decisions about institutions must be taken politically. And in 
taking them the results of legal theory as to what is good law and 
what is not must be allowed due weight. I accept Epstein's point 
that 
some weight should be attached to the rules under which 
a society in the past has organized its property institutions. 
Where those rules are respected there is no need to re-
shuffle entitlements amongst different individuals, in the 
absence of any clear principle that dictates how that re-
shuffling should take place. There is no need, moreover, 
to attack the interests of those who have expended their 
labor and taken their risks on the expectation, reasonable 
to all concerned, that the rules under which they entered 
the game will be the rules under which that game will be 
played until its conclusion. These rules and these alone 
have the status of legal rules at at1.55 
However, unlike him, I think that there is a clear principle accord-
ing to which entitlements among individuals ought to be revised 
and to some extent reshuffle, although it does not dictate its 
own application. 
The implications of traditional morality for the institution of 
property have turned out to be complicated. Property is a social 
institution the specific forms of which must be determined polit-
ically-by the legislative and judicial processes of political societies. 
By sanctioning the existence of political societies except under the 
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special conditions of justified rebellion, traditional morality enjoins 
obedience to their laws, save only when those laws violate it. Hence 
it also enjoins acceptance of the institutions they establish, save only 
when those institutions violate it. Thus morality may place con· 
straints on what forms of a given institution are morally permis-
sible. I have explored some of the constraints it places on forms of 
the institution of property, with regard to the persons of human 
beings, their labour, and natural resources. These constraints imply 
others, which I have not explored at all, on property in the movable 
products of employing labour on natural resources. I offer these 
incomplete results, despite their Raws, in the hope that they may 
help to persuade you both that morality has implications for the 
institution of property, and that establishing a system of property is 
a political matter, which cannot be wholly determined by moral 
considerations. If I have helped to persuade you of these two 
things, I do not mind very much if I have not persuaded you of my 
more specific conclusions. I£ you have discerned mistakes in what 
I have done, you are already in a way to correcting them. 
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